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National Security vs . Whales : The Navy and the Natural  Resources  Defense 
Counsel  Battle Their  Way to the Supreme Court 
 
Alicia  Schaffner1 
 
"We are tied to the ocean. And when we go back to the sea, whether it is to sail or to watch 
it, we are going back from whence we came." 
 
Pres. John F. Kennedy, Australian Ambassadors Dinner for the America’s Cup Crews, 
September 14, 1962, Newport, R.I. 
 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 82 
II.  Listening Underwater .................................................................................................. 83 
III. Impacts of Noise on Marine Mammals ........................................................................ 84 
IV. Marine Mammal Strandings ........................................................................................ 86 
V. Sonar and National Security ........................................................................................ 86 
VI. Winter v. NRDC Timeline ............................................................................................ 88 
 A. August 2007 District Court Opinion ....................................................................... 90 
 B. November 2007 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling......................................... 91 
 C. January 2008 District Court Opinion ..................................................................... 92 
 D. Presidential Exemption and CEQ Alternative Arrangements ............................... 92 
 E. February 2008 District Court Opinion.................................................................... 93 
 F. February 2008 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling .......................................... 94 
VII. U.S. Supreme Court Decision....................................................................................... 94 
VIII. Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 96 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In the past few years, the battle over the Navy’s use of low and mid-frequency sonar has 
become hotly contested. The lines are clearly drawn between two groups advocating two 
very different agendas: marine mammal conservation and national security. Sonar is a 
necessary tool used by the Navy to detect enemy submarines, but environmentalists argue 
that it should be used only with the proper precaution and after the proper planning.  
 
Legally, this is a battle over whether the Navy properly adhered to federally mandated 
environmental planning processes. The National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has 
long argued that the Navy has not properly taken the environmental impacts of its sonar 
activities into account when planning training exercises. As a result, the NRDC frequently 
brings the Navy into court contending that its planning process for sonar training violates 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  
 
The latest skirmish involved a challenge to an Environmental Assessment (EA) prepared by 
the Navy in 2007 for sonar training in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California. After a 
California district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the Navy’s sonar 
training, the Navy appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Winter v. 
NRDC held that the lower courts had not given proper weight to the Navy’s interest in 
                                                
1 J.D. Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2009. 
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military training and protecting national security.2 As a result, the district court had 
improperly enjoined the Navy from conducting sonar training. 
 
This article begins by examining the general use of sonar by the Navy and its effects on 
marine mammals. The article then provides a time line of the Winter v. NRDC litigation, 
followed by an analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
  
II . Listening Underwater 
 
Because of the lack of light in the deep ocean, sound is the primary navigation tool for 
humans and marine life traversing the depths. Marine mammals use echolocation to avoid 
collisions and locate prey. Echolocation is when a cetacean produces sound, most likely via 
vibrations of the nasal sac system near the nasal plugs.3 The nasal sac system consists of a 
series of muscular valves and compliant sacs associated with the blowhole. Air sacs contract 
in synchrony with the echolocation clicks.4 A cetacean’s melon, a fatty structure located in 
its forehead, may serve as an “acoustic lens” to focus outgoing acoustic energy forward into 
the water in order to scan the area ahead of it.5 Vibrations from the water are transmitted 
through the bones of the skull and adaptations allow cetaceans to localize sound 
underwater. Although some cetaceans, such as whales, have other senses including sight, 
touch and taste, hearing is paramount to their survival.6 
 
Since humans cannot naturally echolocate underwater, sailors rely on sonar to keep their 
ships safe. Sonar is an acronym for the phrase “Sound Navigation and Ranging.”7 It is used 
to detect objects, such as underwater mines and other submarines, and estimate their 
range, velocity, and direction. Sonar can also be used to determine water depth. Sonar is 
the Navy’s primary defense from an underwater attack.  
 
The Navy uses two forms of sonar: passive and active. Passive sonar is a listening device 
that uses hydrophones to receive, amplify, and process underwater sounds. Passive sonar is 
used to detect and identify submarines by matching the sounds detected with known 
frequencies of submarine engines and propellers.8 The primary benefit of passive sonar is 
that it can detect certain submarines without placing additional sound into the water. 
Unfortunately, passive sonar is ineffective at detecting modern, quiet submarines and 
submarines that are moving slowly or not at all.9  
 
Active sonar, however, can detect quiet submarines and is extremely useful for precise 
location, classification, and rapid targeting.10 There are three types of active sonar – high, 
mid, and low. High frequency sonar (>10kHz) is generally used to determine water depth, 
                                                
2 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
3 I. A. VAUGHAN ET AL., MAMMALOGY 432-424 (4th ed. 2000).  
4 Id. at 424-427. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 424-427. 
7 U.S. Navy, Understanding Sonar, http://www.navy.mil/oceans/sonar.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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locate mines, and guide torpedoes. High frequency sonar has a short range, less than five 
nautical miles, and produces weak sound energy.11 
 
Mid-frequency sonar (1kHz-10kHz), with a range of one to ten nautical miles, is the 
primary tool for identifying submarines. Mid-frequency sonar is emitted into the water 
column at a pressure of 235+ decibels for about 0.5 – 2 seconds and repeated every 28 
seconds.12 To provide some perspective, this intensity would be similar to that of a rocket 
taking off.13 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires that 
hearing protection be used where workers are exposed to sounds at “90 dB for eight hours 
or 110 dB for as little as thirty minutes.”14 
 
Low frequency sonar (<1kHz) has a range of about 100 nautical miles and is used mostly for 
long-range search and surveillance of submarines.15 While low frequency sonar is quite 
useful for tracking submarines, it has the unfortunate drawback of allowing enemy 
submarines to extrapolate the location of the ship producing the sound.16 As a result, this 
sonar is primarily used during training and maintenance activities. About 58% of the U.S. 
Navy’s surface ships are equipped with active sonar, and about half of these ships are 
underway at any given point in time. 
 
III .  Impacts  of  Noise on Marine Mammals 
 
The oceans are noisy. Oil and gas exploration companies conduct high-energy seismic 
surveys. Commercial shipping ensures a near-constant rumble of engines and propellers. 
Since the sounds generated from these activities fall within the hearing ranges of marine 
mammals, all of this activity creates an underwater world constantly flooded with intense 
sound. 
 
As the level of ocean noise has increased, concerns have risen about the potential impacts 
on marine mammals and other marine life.17 In 2005, the National Research Council (NRC) 
investigated the effects of noise on marine mammal populations. The NRC identified five 
different levels of effects ranging from individual behavior changes to population-level 
changes. The NRC also determined that proximity to the source also correlates to the 
impact of the effect. The closer the cetacean is to the source, the higher the probability that 
the exposure could result in death and acoustic trauma. Marine mammals farther removed 
from the sound may suffer hearing loss or display avoidance techniques and other minor 
behavioral changes.18 
 
                                                
11 MICHAEL JASNY ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, SOUNDING THE DEPTHS II: THE 
RISING TOLL OF SONAR, SHIPPING AND INDUSTRIAL OCEAN NOISE ON MARINE LIFE 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sound/sound.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) 
12 Id. 
13 Ocean Noise Affects Marine Life, 44(5) ENVIRONMENT 4 (2002). 
14 Jasny, supra note 11. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MARINE MAMMAL POPULATIONS AND OCEAN NOISE: DETERMINING 
WHEN NOISE CAUSES BIOLOGICALLY SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS (2005). 
18 Id. 
Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 2008)                                                      85 
 
Not all marine mammals respond to sound in the same way. Some species are very 
susceptible to sonar. The species affected include: the Pygmy Sperm Whale, Gervais’ 
Beaked Whale, Blainville’s Beaked Whale, Melon-Headed Whales, Bottlenosed Dolphin, 
and the Cuvier’s Beaked Whale, which is quite possibly the marine mammal most affected 
by sonar.19 Scientists have not yet determined why these animals are so vulnerable to 
sonar, but all the above species share two traits: the use of echolocation and migration to 
cold waters for feeding and to warmer waters to give birth.20  
 
Both physical and behavioral change can be observed after a marine mammal is exposed to 
acoustic trauma. Physiological damage includes: injury to body tissue, embolism, gross 
damage to the auditory system, permanent and temporary hearing loss and 
disorientation.21 Due to the stress from the sounds, their immune systems are often 
vulnerable to disease and reproductive rates decrease.22 Repetitive exposures to noise, such 
as sonar, may also to lead to chronic impacts, such as desensitization to noise, which results 
in animals remaining near the sources of the damaging sound.23 
 
There are other behavioral effects as well, such as stranding, interruption to normal 
behavior such as feeding, breeding and nursing, loss of efficiency, increased antagonism, 
and displacement from preferred areas.24 Ocean noise may hinder the ability of individual 
cetaceans to communicate with other members of the same species. Biologically important 
sounds may be masked by sonar, which leads to decreased reproductive rates.25 In addition, 
there may be some interference with the ability to acoustically interpret their environment 
and interference with food-finding.26 
 
There may also be some indirect effects on the cetaceans. High intensity sound may affect 
the entire ecosystem. For example, the viability of fish eggs may be reduced and the fish 
themselves may be injured. Sonar may cause temporary deafness which will impact the 
ability of fish to feed, mate, avoid predators, and school.27 The loss of fish and fish eggs may 
reduce the amount of prey available for marine mammals. Ultimately, these changes could 
impact humans if noise contributes to declining fish catch rates.28 However, it has been 
argued that sonar does not have that much of an impact on fish. So far research indicates 
that the most notable effects only arise after fish are continually exposed to the sound, as 
opposed to intermittently exposed.29  
                                                
19 Jasny, supra note 11, at 8-9, 11 
20 whaleroute.com, Whale Migration, http://www.whaleroute.com/migrate/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
21 Jasny, supra note 11, at 7 
22 T. A. Romano et al, Anthropogenic sound and marine mammal health: measures of the nervous 
and immune systems before and after intense sound exposure, 61(7) CANADIAN JOURNAL OF 
FISHERIES AND AQUATIC SCIENCES 1124 (2004).  
23 Jasny, supra note 11, at 7 
24 A. Frantzis, Does Acoustic Testing Strand Whales?, 392 NATURE 29 (1998). 
25 Id. 
26 Patrick Miller et al., Whale Songs Lengthen in Response to Sonar, 405 NATURE 903 (2000). 
27 NRDC v. England, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005) 
available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/051019.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).  
28 Id. 
29 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EXPLORATION OF THE SEA. REPORT OF THE AD-HOC GROUP ON THE 
IMPACTS OF SONAR ON CETACEANS AND FISH (2005), available at 
http://www.ices.dk/advice/Request/EC/DG%20Env/sonar/agisc05.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
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IV. Marine Mammal Strandings 
 
In March 2000, seventeen cetaceans stranded over the course of two days in the Bahamas’ 
Northeast and Northwest Providence Channels.30 The multi-species mass stranding 
included Blainville’s beaked whales, Cuvier’s beaked whales, and Minke whales. Ten of 
these whales survived and returned to the ocean, but the other seven did not. Necropsies 
revealed that the cetaceans had sustained acoustic or impulse trauma evidenced by the 
presence of hemorrhaging in the brain and auditory system. The Navy was conducting 
sonar tests nearby around the time of the stranding and its reports indicate that the 
stranding was caused by mid-frequency sonar.31 Since the stranding, the original 
population of beaked whales in this area has disappeared. They may have been killed or 
permanently displaced because of the sonar testing.32 
 
Marine mammal strandings in the vicinity of underwater sonar testing were first 
documented in the 1960s. Since then, the problem seems to have worsened and several 
mass strandings have coincided with sonar activities.33 In addition to the 2000 Bahamian 
stranding, a mass stranding of approximately 200 melon-headed whales in July 2004 in the 
Hawaiian Islands was linked to the naval exercise RIMPAC ‘04.34 That month, researchers 
also discovered a large concentration of whale strandings near Yokosuka, a major U.S. 
Navy base off the Pacific coast of Japan.35  
 
In January 2005, in the Outer Banks of North Carolina, thirty-four pilot whales, two pygmy 
sperm whales, and one minke whale beached themselves.36 This stranding correlated with a 
Navy sonar exercise.37 These exercises were completed in order to ensure that military 
strike groups were adequately prepared to deploy and work proficiently at sea to aid in the 
fight on terrorism.38 Post-mortem tissue scans showed hemorrhaging in the pygmy sperm 
whale and pilot whale that was consistent with other stranding events.39 
                                                
30 Jasny, supra note 11, at 1. 
31 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND U.S. NAVY, JOINT INTERIM REPORT BAHAMAS MARINE 
MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH 2000 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/stranding_bahamas2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
32 Id. 
33 Jasny, supra note 11, at 8-9. 
34 Id. 
35 NRDC, Protecting Whales from Dangerous Sonar, http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
36 Marc Kaufman, Whale Stranding in NC Followed Navy Sonar Use, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 28, 
2005. 
37 Id.; Jasny, supra note 10, at 8-9. 
38 Press Release, U.S. Navy, Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group Completes Exercise, Jan. 28, 
2005, available at www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16829 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
39 Press Release, NRDC, Government Report on Mass Whale Stranding in N.C. Identifies Naval 
Sonar as Possible Cause, Mar. 29, 2006, available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/060329a.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). Other marine 
mammal deaths possibly linked to military activity include: Madeira in 2000, Greece in 1996, the 
U.S. Virgin Islands in 1998 and 1999, the Canary Islands in 1985, 1988, 1989, 2002, and 2004, the 
Gulf of Alaska in June 2004 and the northwest coast of the United States in 2003. Jansy, supra note 
11, at 8-9. 
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V. Sonar and National Security 
  
The Navy has been firm in its position that the use of sonar in military training is essential 
for national security.40 Many countries, including nations hostile to the U.S., have obtained 
quiet, modern submarines.41 These submarines are extremely dangerous unless the Navy 
can detect them. The Navy trains sonar technicians on both active and passive sonar 
systems. Computers are used for basic training, but field experience is also necessary. 
Because the ocean is so noisy, sonar technicians must learn how to distinguish natural 
sounds from manmade noises. Sailors must learn how to focus during stressful situations, 
because combat can be a time of chaos and panic. According to the Navy, “[l]ive training 
with sonar at sea is essential to the safety of our sailors, their ability to survive submarine 
attacks, and ultimately, their ability to hunt and kill enemy submarines when necessary – 
a critical component of maintaining the security of our nation.”42 
 
The Navy does express concern about the potential impact of active sonar on marine 
mammals, but the Navy’s mission is to defend the United States at sea, through combat if 
necessary. The Navy has spent millions of dollars on scientific research to better 
understand the effects of sound on these creatures. The Navy has pledged their 
commitment to further research and to use mitigation measures to minimize the effects on 
marine mammals; however, they are steadfast in their conviction that the Navy “cannot put 
the lives of its Sailors at risk or fail to remain prepared to defend our nation by eliminating 
active sonar use.”43 
 
In response to claims that sonar is responsible for mass strandings, the Navy asserts that 
its use of sonar has been associated with only a “very small fraction” of marine mammal 
strandings worldwide.44 The Navy forwards other potential explanations of strandings such 
as: disease, parasite infestation, harmful algal blooms, injuries from ship strikes or fishery 
entanglements, exposure to pollution, trauma, starvation, or unusual weather or 
oceanographic events.45  
 
NOAA Fisheries, also referred to as the National Marine Fisheries Services, has conducted 
research into a subset of stranding events known as Marine Mammal Unusual Mortality 
Events to try and determine why they occur. Some of the triggers discovered by NOAA 
Fisheries match the Navy’s explanations including: infections, biotoxins, human interaction 
and malnutrition.46 This does boost the Navy’s assertion that there are other causes of 
                                                
40 Fact Sheet, U.S. Navy, Navy’s Need for Sonar and Marine Mammal Protection Efforts (2008), 
available at http://www.navy.mil/oceans/Need_for_Training_v2.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. Navy, Understanding Sonar:  Navy’s Need for Sonar Training, 
http://www.navy.mil/oceans/training.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
43 U.S. Navy, Understanding Sonar: Marine Mammals and Sound, 
http://www.navy.mil/oceans/maritime.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
44 U.S. Navy, Understanding Sonar: Stranding Events, http://www.navy.mil/oceans/strand.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
45 Id. 
46 NOAA Fisheries, Marine Mammal Unusual Mortality Events, 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/health/mmume/ . 
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marine mammal strandings. However, it does not detract from the fact that in some 
situations military sonar has been positively linked to marine mammal stranding events. 
 
As evidence of its environmental ethic, the Navy has developed an “At Sea” policy to help 
sailors comply with environmental requirements during naval exercises and training.47 The 
policy states that “the Navy shall comply with applicable statutes, regulations and 
executive orders and will strive to protect the environment, prevent pollution, and protect 
natural, historic, and cultural resources.”48  
 
The Navy policy mandates that major fleet exercises be reviewed for environmental 
compliance and for potential consequences on marine mammals and other marine life. 
Mitigation measures must be used and can include conducting exercises in areas known to 
lack concentrations of marine mammals, posting highly trained lookouts, listening for 
marine mammals with passive sonar, creating buffer zones within which operations will be 
altered or delayed if marine mammals are present, ceasing sonar operations if marine 
mammals are detected within 200 yards of an active sonar dome, and conducting aerial 
searches for marine mammals in the area before, during, and after sonar operations.49  
 
Because some the mitigation measures are highly dependent on visual surveys, most 
exercises occur during the day. When exercises are conducted at night, the Navy relies on 
night vision equipment, radar, and passive sonar to locate protected animals and coral 
reefs.50 The Navy has designed these measures to help ship commanders maintain 
readiness and protect the environment during training and exercises by identifying and 
utilizing appropriate protective measures for sensitive marine life.51  
 
VI.  Winter v. NRDC Timeline 
 
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), federal activities affecting a state’s 
coastal resources must “be carried out in a manner that is consistent to the maximum 
extent practicable” with that state’s coastal management plan.52 To ensure this mandate is 
implemented, the CZMA requires federal agencies to submit a consistency determination to 
the relevant state agency before undertaking activities.53  
 
On October 30, 2006, the Navy submitted plans for fourteen training exercises using mid-
frequency sonar, scheduled from February 2007 through January 2009 off the coast of 
Southern California, to the California Coastal Commission.54 These exercises, involving 
various ships, submarines, amphibious vehicles, aircraft, and live ordinance, were intended 
                                                
47 The Undersecretary of the Navy, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of 
Marine Corps Subj. Compliance with Environmental Requirements in the Conduct of Naval 
Exercises or Training at Sea 1 (Dec. 28, 2000), available at 
http://www.navy.mil/oceans/At_Sea_Policy_Memo.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
48 Id. at 2.  
49 U.S. Navy, Environmental Stewardship: Marine Mammal Protection, 
http://www.navy.mil/oceans/protection.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 33 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). 
53 Id. § 1456(c)(1)(C). 
54 Kenneth Weiss, Bush Acts to Lift Curbs on Navy Sonar Use, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008. 
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to prepare naval strike groups for deployment to the western Pacific and the Middle East.55 
This submission set off the two-year legal battle that has yet to be completely resolved.  
 
In January 2007, the Commission voted to allow the Navy’s exercises to continue if the 
Navy abided by strict mitigation measures relating primarily to the use of sonar.56 Some of 
the Commission’s mitigation measures included maintaining sound levels below 154 dB, 
avoiding seamounts, and utilizing two NOAA-trained observers to monitor the sonar use.57 
However, because the Navy did not agree that sonar would “result in reasonably 
foreseeable effects to California’s coastal uses or resources,” it refused to comply with the 
Commission’s proposed mitigation measures.58 
 
In response to a successful previous sonar lawsuit by the NRDC, Congress amended the 
MMPA in 2003 to authorize the Secretary of Defense to “exempt any action or category of 
actions undertaken by the Department of Defense or its components from compliance with 
any requirement of [the MMPA], if the Secretary determines that it is necessary for 
national defense.”59 The Department of Defense issued the Navy a National Defense 
Exemption for the California training exercises in January 2007.60 The exemption was 
conditional, however. The Navy was required to implement twenty-nine specific conditions 
designed to protect marine mammals which were developed in coordination with NOAA 
Fisheries, including: 
  
1) training lookouts and officers to watch for marine mammals; (2) requiring at least 
five lookouts with binoculars on each vessel to watch for anomalies on the water 
surface (including marine mammals); (3) requiring aircraft and sonar operators to 
report detected marine mammals in the vicinity of the training exercises; (4) 
requiring reduction of active sonar transmission levels by 6 dB if a marine mammal 
is detected within 1,000 yards of the bow of the vessel, or by 10 dB if detected within 
500 yards; (5) requiring complete shutdown of active sonar transmission if a marine 
mammal is detected within 200 yards of the vessel; (6) requiring active sonar to be 
operated at the “lowest practicable level”; and (7) adopting coordination and 
reporting procedures.61 
 
In February 2007, prior to the first scheduled test, the Navy released an environmental 
assessment (EA) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).62 NEPA 
requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS) for “major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”63 If the 
significance of the action is unknown or unclear, an agency may first prepare an EA to 
                                                
55 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 698 (9th Cir. 2008). 
56 Jane Kay, Strict Rules for Navy’s Use of Sonar Off Coast, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 11, 
2007.  
57 Id. 
58 California Coastal Panel Seeking AG Advice on Navy Sonar Stance, INSIDE THE NAVY, Mar. 12, 
2007. 
59 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f). 
60 43 Fed. Reg. 4189, 4190 (Jan. 24, 2008). 
61 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S.Ct. 365, 371-372 (2008). 
62 U.S. NAVY, COMPOSITE TRAINING UNIT EXERCISES AND JOINT TASK FORCE EXERCISES FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT/OVERSEAS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 107, 115 (2007). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
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determine whether the potential environmental impacts will rise to a level which warrants 
the preparation of an EIS.64 If, after the preparation of EA, the agency concludes that the 
impact will not be significant, it may issue a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) 
and refrain from producing an EIS.65 
 
In its EA, the Navy estimated that the sonar use during the fourteen training exercises 
would result in the taking of 170,000 marine mammals.66 Most of these would be non-lethal 
behavioral-type takes, primarily as the result of harassment. The Navy also estimated that 
there was the potential for “8,000 exposures powerful enough to cause a temporary 
threshold shift in the affected mammals’ sense of hearing and an additional 466 instances 
of permanent injury to beaked and ziphiid whales.”67 Despite these findings, the Navy 
concluded that the training exercises would not have a significant impact on the 
environment and, therefore, an EIS was not required.68 The Navy commenced training 
operations on schedule. 
 
In March 2007, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed suit in the district 
court for the Central District of California. The NRDC claimed the Navy violated NEPA by 
failing to prepare an adequate EA that considered “the cumulative impacts of, and all 
reasonable alternatives to, the proposed actions” and by failing to prepare an EIS despite 
“the potential for the challenged exercises to have a significant impact on the 
environment.”69 With respect to the CZMA, the NRDC argued that the Navy “failed to carry 
out federal activities that affect California’s costal zone in a manner consistent with the 
[California Coastal Management Plan].”70   
 
A. August 2007 District Court Opinion 
 
In August 2007, the District Court enjoined the Navy’s sonar training activities.71 According 
to the district court, a preliminary injunction may be granted when the party seeking the 
injunction demonstrates “either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the 
possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of 
hardships tips in its favor.”72   
 
                                                
64 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
65 Id. § 1501.4(e). 
66 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7. 2007). 
67 Id. 
68 U.S. Navy, supra note 62, at 112. 
69 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). 
70 Id. The CZMA claim was eventually dropped from the lawsuit. The CZMA allows the President to 
exempt federal agencies from compliance with a state CMP when he “determines that the activity is 
in the paramount interest of the United States.” (16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B)). In January 2008, after 
determining that Navy’s use of mid-frequency sonar in the SOCAL training exercises was “essential 
to national security” and “in the paramount interests of the United States,” President Bush 
exempted the Navy from compliance with the CZMA. (Marc Kaufman, Navy Wins Exemption from 
Bush to Continue Sonar Exercises in California, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2008). This was 
the first time this provision had been invoked. 
71 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). 
72 Id. 
Sea Grant Law and Policy Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 2008)                                                      91 
 
The court found that NRDC “raised substantial questions as to whether the SOCAL 
exercises will have a significant impact on the environment.”73 The NRDC presented 
substantial scientific evidence to the court linking marine mammal strandings to sonar 
activities. Although the Navy has been using mid-frequency sonar in California training 
exercises for over thirty years without one documented stranding, the court concluded that 
“a lack of documented evidence of the disturbance, injury, or even death of marine 
mammals in a particular geographic area does little to prove that MFA sonar never caused 
such adverse effects.”74 The Navy even acknowledged this potential for harm in its EA. 
 
The court also concluded that NRDC demonstrated a probability of success on their claim 
that the Navy’s proposed mitigation measures were inadequate. “An agency may avoid the 
requirement to prepare an EIS by adopting mitigation measures sufficient to eliminate any 
substantial questions over the potential for significant impact on the environment.”75 The 
court found that the 1,000-yard safety zone and presence of visual monitors would do little 
to protect the whales from the effects of the sonar.  
 
The court granted NRDC’s requested preliminary injunction after determining that NRDC 
“established to a near certainty that use of MFA sonar during the planned SOCAL exercises 
will cause irreparable harm to the environment.”76 The court was satisfied that the balance 
of harm tilted in favor of NRDC, because the harm to the environment “outweighs the harm 
that [the Navy] would incur if prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use of effective 
mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities in one part of one state for a 
limited period.”77 
 
B. November 2007 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling 
 
The Navy appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court failed to properly balance the harms. 
“The district court was required to consider, not only ‘balance of hardships’ as between the 
[NRDC] and the Navy as an Executive Branch agency, but also the ‘public interest’ in 
having a trained and effective Navy.”78 The Ninth Circuit granted the Navy's motion to stay 
the preliminary injunction pending appeal.  
 
After hearing the appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the “[p]laintiffs have met the 
necessary burden of proof to demonstrate that some form of preliminary injunctive relief is 
appropriate.”79 The court found that the NRDC met its burden for injunctive relief because 
the NRDC showed “a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims,” as well as 
the fact that they might suffer “irreparable injury” if relief is not granted.80 The court also 
found that the balance of hardships tipped in favor of the NRDC and that the public 
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interest would be served by an injunction that prescribed the proper mitigation measures.81 
The court vacated the stay of injunction and remanded the case to the district court so it 
could enter a “modified preliminary injunction” containing the “appropriate mitigating 
conditions.”82 
 
C. January 2008 District Court Opinion  
 
The struggle to find the proper balance between environmental protection and national 
security continued after the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court. The court 
tried to craft more balanced mitigation measures which would satisfy the desires of both 
sides. In the end, the court imposed a number of mitigation measures on the Navy’s 
training exercise. First, the court required the Navy “maintain a 12 nautical mile exclusion 
zone from the California coastline at all times.”83 Second, the Navy was prohibited from 
using any type of MFA sonar when marine mammals are spotted within 2,200 yards 
(approximately 2,000 meters).84 Third, the court required the Navy to “monitor for the 
presence of marine mammals for 60 minutes before employing MFA sonar” and use aerial 
monitoring and two dedicated NOAA-trained lookouts at all times. Finally, MFA sonar has 
to be powered down “in the presence of significant surface ducting conditions” (which causes 
sound to travel at higher intensities than normal) and the Navy had to avoid using “MFA 
sonar in the geographically restricted, biologically rich Catalina Basin.”85 The Navy filed for 
appeal on January 11, 2008, but the Ninth Circuit quickly denied their request for a stay.86 
 
D. Presidential Exemption and CEQ Alternative Arrangements 
 
When the Ninth Circuit refused to stay the district court’s injunction, the Navy sought 
relief through the Executive Branch. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), located 
within the Executive Office of the President, consented to the Navy’s use of ‘“alternate 
arrangements”’ to comply with NEPA “because ‘emergency circumstances’ prevented 
normal compliance.”87  
 
Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant 
environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the federal 
agency taking the action should consult with the CEQ about alternative arrangements. 
Agencies and the CEQ will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the 
immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.88 
 
The CEQ was established to assist federal agencies with the implementation of NEPA and 
works with other agencies and executive offices to develop “environmental policies and 
initiatives.”89 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 allows CEQ to permit federal agencies, in “emergency 
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circumstances,” to take actions that will affect the environment without observing the 
ordinary NEPA procedural requirements. Any alternative arrangements developed by the 
federal agency and CEQ should be tailored to control the “immediate impacts of the 
emergency.”90  
 
The CEQ determined that the district court’s injunction “imposes training restrictions that 
continue to create a significant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be able to 
train and be certified as fully mission capable.’’91 The alternative arrangements approved 
by the CEQ included: “(1) providing notice to the public regarding ongoing EIS preparation; 
(2) a commitment to continue research measures ‘‘for continual improvement in the quality 
of information’’ on the ‘‘quantity, distribution, migration, and reactions of marine mammals 
to MFA sonar;’’ and (3) maintaining the [mitigation measures required by the National 
Defense Exemption].”92 
 
The alternative arrangements would be in place for the remaining training exercises. The 
Navy agreed to complete the EIS it was currently working on for the SOCAL exercises. A 
final draft of the EIS was released in December 2008.93 
 
E. February 2008 District Court Opinion 
 
The CEQ’s actions prompted the Navy to move to vacate the district court’s injunction with 
respect to the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the restrictions on training in surface ducting 
conditions. The district court held that §1506.11 was inapplicable to the Navy’s situation 
because there was no emergency circumstances.94 In previous cases upholding the CEQ’s 
approval of alternative arrangements for military activities, courts deferred to CEQ’s 
determination “based on facts suggesting the need to avert imminent crises outside the 
agency’s control.”95  
 
Here, however, the district court concluded that any “emergency,” if there was one, was 
largely of the Navy’s own making. The Navy knew there was a possibility that an injunction 
could be issued. The possible outcomes of litigation are far from sudden and can be 
prepared for ahead of time.96 According to the court, this emergency arose from the Navy’s 
failure to provide the environmental documentation required to conduct these tests in a 
timely manner.97 The court also had difficulty categorizing routine naval training as an 
emergency.98 The court refused to read “emergency circumstances” so broadly as to 
“permit[] agencies to avoid their NEPA obligations by re-characterizing ordinary, planned 
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activities as ‘emergencies’ in the interests of national security, economic stability, or other 
long-term policy goals.”99 
 
The court recognized that Congress, if it so chooses, can change the law in order to change 
the outcome of litigation. However, neither the executive nor the legislative branch can 
encroach on judicial power by directing the outcome of litigation.100 The court denied the 
Navy’s request for a stay of the previous injunction. The court reasoned that the injunction 
allows the Navy to train, albeit with mitigation measures. The court found the injunction to 
be in the public interest, because it allows for training to maintain national security in a 
way that is least detrimental to the environment.101 Ultimately, the court held that the stay 
allows the Navy to continue training exercises “while limiting negative effects on marine 
life.”102 
 
F. February 2008 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling 
 
On February 29, 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s February ruling.103 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Navy’s need to train with mid-frequency sonar 
without the use of mitigation measures did not qualify as an “emergency circumstance” 
under CEQ regulation. As such, it was not entitled to alternative accommodations under 
NEPA and the Navy was bound to act under the parameters of the district court’s narrowly 
tailored injunction.  
 
VII.  U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
 
After this long and winding road of litigation, the case finally moved to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Navy raised two primary issues on appeal: (1) whether the Ninth Circuit was 
correct in determining that the district court was not compelled to vacate its preliminary 
injunction after the CEQ determined that the imposed mitigation measures created an 
emergency circumstance and (2) whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction was 
valid. 
 
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court, apparently favoring national security over 
environmental protection, held the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training “plainly 
outweighed” the NRDC’s important interest in the preservation of marine mammals.104 The 
Court, however, did not reach the merits of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on procedural grounds.  
 
The lower courts had held that once a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits, “a preliminary injunction may be entered based only on a 
‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”105 The Supreme Court agreed with the Navy that this 
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standard is “too lenient.”106 According to the Court, “a plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”107 
 
Although the district court originally determined that irreparable harm would result from 
sonar training exercises generally, the court did not revisit its findings after the Navy 
agreed to abide by four of the court’s six mitigation measures. By the time the litigation 
reached the Supreme Court, the Navy was only challenging the 2,200-yard shutdown zone 
and the requirement to power down during surface ducting conditions. The Supreme Court 
found this failure to be significant, as the four mitigation measures could significantly 
reduce the risk of harm.108 
 
But even if the NRDC had shown irreparable injury, the Supreme Court determined that 
the injury was “outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, 
realistic training of its sailors.”109 The Court found that the lower courts had “significantly 
understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the Navy’s ability to 
conduct realistic training exercises.”110 The interests of the Navy with respect to national 
security and training must be weighed against “possible harm to the ecological, scientific, 
and recreational interests” asserted by the NRDC.111 In this case, the Court held that the 
balance tipped in favor of the Navy. The Court made clear, however, that “military interests 
do not always trump other considerations.”112  
 
The Court found that the lower courts did not seriously consider the balance of harm to the 
parties, especially the harm to the public interest in national defense. The Court 
emphasized the lower court’s lack of deference to Navy officers’ judgments about how the 
injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s training. The Navy presented 
evidence that the mitigation measures would force the Navy to deploy a submarine force 
that is inadequately trained in the use of sonar which is the only instrument reliable 
enough to detect the enemy submarines and thus necessary to detect enemy submarines.113 
The Supreme Court held that the assertions of military experts with respect to training 
needs and national security threats were entitled to “great deference.”114  
 
The Supreme Court held that “the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200-
yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power down its MFA sonar during 
significant surface ducting conditions.”115 The Ninth Circuit had determined that requiring 
the Navy to shutdown MFA beyond its self-imposed zone of 200 yards would not be 
burdensome because marine mammal sighting were rare. The Supreme Court noted, 
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however, that the injunction would greatly expand the radius of the zone and that if the 
shutdowns occurred during critical times it could delay training for several days, imposing 
a significant burden on the Navy. With respect to the requirement to “power down” during 
surface ducting conditions, the Ninth Circuit determined this was a reasonable restriction 
because the Navy had certified other training groups without training in such conditions. 
The Supreme Court again disagreed, finding that because submariners take advantage of 
the phenomenon to avoid being detected by sonar and since this phenomenon is rare, it is 
particularly important for the Navy to be able to train under these conditions. The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and vacated the preliminary injunction to 
the extent it was challenged by the Navy.  
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
The lengthy litigation between the Navy and NRDC has finally come to an end, just in time 
for a new round of military training exercises.116 The Navy does seem to have a growing 
marine stewardship ethic. When it comes to prioritizing their duties, however, the Navy 
places protecting the country before protecting marine life and the environment. The 
Supreme Court seems to agree that the Navy’s responsibilities with respect to national 
security come before their responsibility as stewards to the environment. Although the 
NRDC made a valid argument that that the Navy should have prepared an EIS before 
proceeding with the training, the Supreme Court did not address that issue. Justice 
Ginsberg, in her dissent, wrote in support of the NRDC’s position and highlighted how the 
Navy undermined the purpose behind NEPA with their actions in this case.117 Justice 
Ginsburg suggests that all of this litigation could have been avoided had the Navy just 
acted properly from the beginning. 
 
Of course, this case is not a total loss for the NRDC. The lower courts imposed six 
mitigation measures on the Navy’s testing. Four remain in place following the Supreme 
Court’s decision. The training exercises conducted by the Navy during the past two years 
were therefore more environmentally friendly than they might have been without the 
litigation.  
 
Justice Roberts, using a quote from President Theodore Roosevelt, suggests that “the only 
way in which a Navy can ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all the 
conditions which would have to be met if war existed.”118 The Navy’s efforts to develop the 
capability to detect enemy submarines are an essential component of its military 
responsibilities. But the ocean and all of the creatures within it are an integral part of the 
human ecosystem. If agencies are allowed to perform actions that will have a significant 
effect on the environment without adequate forethought, the environment will suffer in the 
long run. A balance between national security and environmental protection must be found 
before it is too late.  
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